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FEDERAL CENSORSHIP: OBSCENITY IN THE MAIL. By James C. N. Paul and 
Murray L. Schwartz. New York: Free Press of Glencoe. 1961. Pp. 883. $7.o0. 
This is in many ways an exemplary piece of contemporary legal scholar-
ship. It is a monograph on a single legal topic. The topic is rich in color 
and interest and has social significance. And the study was planned as 
one in depth, approaching the problem along several dimensions by paral-
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leling a survey of legal doctrine with a close look at legislative history,1 and 
with a close look too at the law in actual operation. This last in particular 
has required use of the research techniques of the field study, and among 
other things, the book may well be viewed as a substantial addition to the 
new and growing literature of empirical legal studies. Further, the authors 
do not merely report but add a critical essay exploring the rationale for 
obscenity regulation and providing a series of recommendations as to the 
proper role of the federal government in this field. Federal Censorship 
thus shows evidences both of an impressive amount of digging for informa-
tion and of an impressive amount of reflection on policy. Finally, if read 
closely, it furnishes a welcome storehouse of ammunition in its data and 
conclusions for those who, like myself,2 would like to see postal censorship 
disappear from the American scene. 
Yet despite this impressive roster of virtues, there were for me certain 
puzzling shortcomings in the book. With the customary perversity of the 
reviewer I shall devote my space to an elaboration of these points rather 
than attempt an evaluation of some of the authors' challenging proposals 
for reform of the law in this area.3 
A first difficulty is that the book seems at many points to lose its focus. 
It would be difficult with a topic of this sort to allocate satisfactorily space 
and emphasis between obscenity problems and postal problems.4 But I can-
not down the impression that the authors became too interested in the 
general obscenity problem. One consequence is that the book is open to the 
charge of rehashing much that has become familiar in the prior full studies 
of the law of obscenity that we have had from Lockhart and McClure and 
from St. J ohn-Stevas.5 The other consequence is that at points they underplay 
problems distinctive to postal control. Since we have had so little serious 
1 The legislative history yields perhaps the most refreshing materials in the book. 
There is fascinating material from Lord Lynhurst's witty reactions to Lord Campbell's 
Act in 1857, to the Calhoun debates in 1836 over proposals for postal censorship of 
abolitionist tracts, to the one-man lobby of Anthony Comstock, to the debate between 
Senator Cushing and Senator Smoot in 1930 over the obscenity provisions of the Tariff 
Act. 
2 My own views on the law of obscenity have been set forth in the Metaphysics of 
the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUPREME COURT REv. I; and Obscenity and the Law, Z1 
LmRARY Q. 201 (1957); also in Book Review, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 769 (1957). 
s The book covers not only postal censorship but Customs as well. The authors, in 
their final recommendations, leave some role for federal administrative screening via 
Customs. See pp. 227-28; 235-37. 
4 The most arresting of the authors' ideas is the effort to treat obscenity as a rela-
tional concept depending on the audience and the manner of circulation. In developing 
this approach, the authors properly find great significance in the Kinsey case, United 
States v. Thirty-one Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). This sort of graduated 
"adults only" approach to the problem seems to me attractive in theory but probably 
"not worth the candle" in practice. See pp. 205-19. 
Ii Lockhart 8: McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional 
Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960); Lockhart 8: McClure, Literature, the Law of 
Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295 (1954); and ST. JoHN·STEVAS, 
OBSCENITY AND THE LAW (1956). 
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study of these problems to date, this seems to be something of a pity. I had 
hoped to find the arguments on the legality of postal censorship vigorously 
marshalled and scrutinized; instead the relevant materials are scattered 
throughout the book and the conclusions are stated so quietly that unless 
one reads with care he may well miss the authors' conclusions that postal 
censorship has probably been unconstitutional6-as well as inadvertent 
from the viewpoint of Congress7-for these many years, and should be 
abandoned in the future.8 
Certainly some good points are slighted. There is little explicit wrest-
ling with the anomaly of applying a national standard of "community 
sentiment" in this area, given the wide variety of sentiments in New York 
and Massachusetts, for example.9 And this without the use of the jury. 
Nor do we ever get a report from the interview materials on how the ad-
ministrators themselves sought to solve this dilemma. 
Again because they decide to stick with obscenity and ignore other 
forms of postal censorship,10 the authors do not confront the interesting 
fact that Congress has so rarely attempted to build from the rationale on 
which postal activity is said to be legally justified to any other form of 
censorship-although if the legal arguments are good at all they would 
give Congress far wider power over communications than it has thus far 
chosen to exercise. This seems to have been the point of the celebrated 
Esquire case11 which the book treats as primarily concerned with limiting 
the sanction of revocation of second-class mail privileges. The larger signif-
icance of the case, I think, lies in the obvious reluctance of the Court to 
permit postal censorship to be expanded beyond obscenity. 
Nor does the book pay sufficient attention to the significance of the old 
precedent that the fourth amendment does apply to the postal power.12 This 
6 See pp. 31-37, 159, 166. 
7 See pp. 23, 28, 231. It is perhaps unfair to charge that the authors failed to antic-
ipate the reaction of Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Douglas to the 
statutory construction problem in the very recent decision in Manuel Enterprises, Inc. 
v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962). But it is striking that reading the book would never 
prepare one for the fact that, in 1962, three Justices of the United States Supreme Court 
would seriously and flatly hold that Congress had never authorized postal censorship. 
Further, it might be observed that the legislative history materials are arguably more 
fully and effectively handled in the opinions of both Justices Brennan and Clark than 
in the book-I think primarily this is the result of their being vigorously marshalled 
in the opinions. 
s See p. 227. The book also suggests a specific list of reforms if it is to be retained; 
see pp. 233-35. 
9 In Manuel Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962), it is refreshing to find that 
Mr. Justice Harlan did confront this problem squarely. He stated: "We think that the 
proper test under this federal statute, reaching as it does to all parts of the United States 
whose population reflects many different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, is a national 
standard of decency." Id. at 488. 
10 Seep. xi. 
11 Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946), discussed in the book at pp. 73-77. 
12 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). As the authors carefully point out, this part 
of the opinion is dictum, but an unchallenged dictum. See pp. 32-33. 
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raises the puzzler of why then the first amendment does not equally apply; 
and, moreover, it illuminates on what a curious house of cards the postal 
censorship power has been built. Under this ruling the post office cannot 
administratively touch first-class mail; hence, the entire edifice of postal 
control rests on the fact of mail subsidies and on the permission given for 
that reason to the postal authorities to inspect second-class mail. 
Finally, the intricate and mysterious legal issue of the status of prior 
restraints keyed to obscenity seems to me not to have been dealt with per-
sistently enough. Are the precedents on movie censorship applicable to 
postal censorship?lS 
There are two other puzzles with the book that reflect the desire of 
Professors Paul and Schwartz to give their study a touch of sociological 
significance and perhaps suggest points of a more general reach. First, the 
authors decided to view the problem in historical perspective and to or-
ganize their exposition along chronological lines. As a study in the process 
of legal and social change I do not think the book comes off and I think it 
was a mistake to cast it in so ambitious a mold. The large time periods into 
which the basic exposition is divided struck me as highly arbitrary and lent 
themselves to such unfortunate subtitles as: "Part II. Development from 
1930 to 1945: How Law and Censorship Responded to Social Change"; or 
again: "Part III. Post War Developments: Another Period of Evolution, 
1946 to 1956." Presumably it is this perspective, too, which produced sen-
tences such as: "What was happening?-sober, intelligent, objective Amer-
icans wanted to know. Where were we going? Where should we be going?"14 
Moreover, this historical structure produces a very choppy and con-
fusing sequence as the authors hop from tracing legal doctrine to tracing 
legislative history to tracing law in action over the four major time periods. 
I have rarely encountered a book which seems so much the victim of its 
basic plan of organization. 
We are told in the introduction that the study involved considerable 
empirical research with interviews with officials, digging in old files, etc.15 
And the reporting out of this effort to document the law in action looms 
large in exposition. It is for me the key puzzle of the book that I did not 
find the harvest from this empirical attack more rewarding. To a minor 
extent this may be the fault of the authors; they do not report their field 
work directly and with the professional empiricist's touch. We never learn 
how this part of this study was designed, just who was interviewed, and just 
what the results from the interviews were. But the difficulties in their path 
must have been formidable. Presumably they could find little in the way 
13 The book suggests that the answer may be "no"; see p. 159. There is a dangerous 
tendency to handle constitutional issues by counting Justices-a practice that may have 
already rendered certain conclusions obsolete upon the appointments of Justices White 
and Goldberg. 
14 P. 188. 
15 Pp. xii-xv. 
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of existing records-their best material often seems to have come from cases
that reached the courts and the official reports.
The topic appears in retrospect to have been against them too. It is
not dear just how one would measure how much postal censorship there
has been. And with a substantive criterion like obscenity it is not clear how
one can profitably compare the law on the books with the law in action. The
authors spend time and effort carefully collecting and describing for us
particular instances of postal censorship; these items are, to be sure, colorful
and amusing, but they do not tell us much since we do not know with
what to compare them. Federal Censorship thus provides a major instance
for consideration in estimating the kind of enlargement of insight the
current movement toward sociological studies of legal phenomena is likely
to give us. Harry Kalven, Jr.,
Professor of Law,
University of Chicago
